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Self-governance of space habitats using Stochastic Democracy is objective and corruption-
resistant.  Prior simulation studies compared Stochasticism with elitism, pure communism, 
and pure capitalism for long-duration ark ships, demonstrating superior outcomes for all 
individuals.  Additional simulations explored resilience to decimation, and to rapid 
population growth, such as may be experienced by large space settlements.  In this study, the 
initial population of a hierarchical governing structure is simulated, providing a procedure 
for start-up on Day 1.  Furthermore, rules for re-selection are explored to provide a balance 
of fresh inputs and experienced leadership.  A key tenet of Stochastic Democracy is 
preclusion of career politicians who can be unduly influenced by campaign contributions 
and unduly favored by redistricting (“gerrymandering”).  However, preserving learning 
within a governmental hierarchy is valuable, so the re-selection process should include a 
means by which selected leaders either retain office or advance to greater levels of 
geographic and population responsibility.  Staggering of terms is another important means 
by which some level of continuity of governance is retained.  In this work, several 
alternatives are explored to provide a sense of the impacts of re-selection rules.  It is 
conceivable that individual communities may vote on referenda which capture their 
preferences for re-selection rules and duration of terms.  In this way, Stochastic Democracy 
becomes adaptable to the community sociology and to possible future changes in lifespan. 
This work completes earlier AIAA-published theoretical studies of this novel form of habitat 
self-governance. 
I. Introduction 
 he SPACE 2010 and SPACE 2013 publications upon which this work is based1,2 introduced and explored a 
model of a corruption-resistant form of representative government based on stochastic selection within pre-
established constraints.  The first study compared Stochastic Democracy with three forms of governance:  elitism, 
where 15% of the population control a disproportionate share of overall wealth; capitalism, a merit-based system 
where a minimal government provides infrastructure and order; and pure communism where benefits are distributed 
regardless of individual effort or ambition.  Each of the 4 governance systems was applied to an agent-based 
simulation (populace and government) of a closed habitat isolated for 10 years (e.g. an ark spaceship).  Stochastic 
Democracy was found to be superior in lives preserved, smallest number of impoverished citizens, and reasonable 
distribution of wealth.  Capitalism was found to perform nearly as well with lives preserved but evolved a bimodal 
wealth distribution similar to that of elitism.  Communism fared poorly on all figures of merit.  The second study 
explored hierarchical districting using the method of k-means.  The resiliency of this approach was tested by 
subjecting the population to either massive immigration or decimation.  Changes in population density over 2 orders 
of magnitude were readily adapted to by the 2-level government hierarchy for a population of 50,000.  Those results 
also demonstrate the ability of Stochastic Democracy to scale up from a minimal population of about 4,000 to a 
population of any size, even spanning multiple planets and, eventually, multiple star systems.  What has been 
missing up to this point is an exploration of how Stochastic Democracy gets started.  Specifically, how does one 
create a complete government hierarchy on Day 1 when office holders all start at the same time and then transition 
smoothly to a steady state with staggered terms of service? 
In this work a population of 3,500,000 living within a square area of 37.5 x 37.5 kilometers adopts Stochastic 
Democracy on Day 1 for governance hierarchy having 4 levels, as determined by the formula in reference 2.  The 
top level (4) has 9 leaders, and lower levels have powers of 9, namely:  81 for level 3; 729 for level 2; and 6,561 for 
level 1.  Law-makers are selected from a pool of volunteers, assuming that 4% of the population both volunteers and 
meets the minimum requirements for service, namely:  (1) no felony record; (2) never declared personal bankruptcy; 
and (3) completed a 4 year program such as a college degree or equivalent military service.  These requirements are 
not meant to be elitist, but rather are screening tools to preclude known criminals, poor fiscal managers, and those 
for whom completing a multi-year program (such as government leadership) has not been demonstrated.  Terms of 
service are 3 years at each level, however in Years 1, 2, and 3, some terms are abbreviated to achieve staggering. 
T 
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Figure 1. Initial Selection showing spatial distribution of representation at 4 levels. 
 
 
II. Method  
 Continuity within the leaders of government provides for long-term planning and allows established 
representatives to train newly-selected ones during term overlap.  Those governments where undue influence exists, 
and where re-districting is subject to political fortunes (gerrymandering) generally have strong continuity.  Where 
re-election is a very high probability (the U.S. Congress being a very good example) there is incentive for wealthy 
individuals, cabals, or corporations to establish close relations with leaders often in anticipation of favorable 
consideration.  While such systems preserve the status quo effectively, the degree to which they fairly represent the 
entire constituency is limited.  At the opposite extreme, rapid changeovers of entire governments is inefficient and 
raises concerns of uncertainty which can dampen enthusiasm for investments in business and infrastructure.  
Stochastic Democracy aims to balance these factors through two inter-woven methods:  stochastic selection, and re-
selection rules, which are the primary focus of the current work. 
A. Stochastic Selection 
A stochastic process is one in which the evolution over time of some system of random variables is 
unpredictable and there are an almost infinite number of potential outcomes.  Nevertheless, it is possible to 
characterize responses and derive response bounds approached as a limit.  Starting Stochastic Democracy on Day 1 
is the Initial Selection process in which pre-qualified volunteers are grouped by district for the various levels of a 
government hierarchy and then selected at random from the pool of local candidates until the leadership positions 
are all filled.  This is the only time selection is so easy, at Day 1 of Year 0.  Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution as 
color-coded markers on a square grid with 10 meter increments.  Level 1 is shown as red dots, level 2 as blue 
diamonds, level 3 as black triangles, and level 4 as large green star-shapes. 
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Figure 3.  Transition State Machine for Re-selection. 
 
 
A simple method for transition from an all-at-once start to an on-going steady state in which 1/N positions are 
exchanged each year within an N year service term is to abbreviate a 1/N portion of the Day 1 appointments at Year 
1, and another 1/N portion at Year 2, and so on to Year N.  For this work, the transition years up to Year N are 
individually coded and unique.  Steady state begins at year N+1, and a common algorithm is used for every 
subsequent year.  This sequence is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 
B. Re-Selection Rules 
Preservation of continuity of government is accomplished in Stochastic Democracy by comparing a random 
variable within probability bins to determine the treatment 
of an individual decision-maker upon completion of a term 
of service.  There are five possible outcomes: 
1. Re-selected for service at the same level (STAY), 
2. Return to the local candidate pool but still remain 
eligible for later selection (OUT), 
3. Retire from service, returning to the general 
population (RETIRE), 
4. Be considered for a subsequent term at a level 
lower within the hierarchy (DOWN), and 
5. Be considered for a subsequent term at a higher 
level within the hierarchy (UP). 
 
  Figure 3 shows a state machine for Re-selection.  
The lowest level has the STAY, OUT, and UP options; the 
top level has STAY, OUT, and DOWN options; and all 
intermediate levels have STAY, OUT, DOWN, and UP 
options.  The RETIRE option is not shown but is applied 
programmatically in the simulation.  Note the presence of 
two temporary candidate pools, the UP POOL and the 
TRANSITION POOL.  These are temporary asignations at 
the end of Re-selection and accessed again during the 
Vacancy Fill operation immediately after. 
 
Figure 4 shows the probabilities used for the baseline Re-
selection Process used from Year N+1 onward.  The 
allocation of probability bins in Fig. 4 are arbitrary.  In 
subsequent sections these baseline probability bins are 
modified to explore their impact on continuity of 
government and representation of the citizenry. 
 
 
Figure 2. Phase-in sequence from Initial Selection to on-going staggered selection in Year N+1. 
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C. Vacancy Fill  
When Re-selection results in STAY, OUT, or RETIRE, the action is immediate.  Those moved OUT of office 
remain active volunteers in the local candidate pool, and as will be shown below, are sometimes selected again after 
many years.  Of course volunteers can remove themselves (RETIRE) at any time. 
 
The number of vacancies at each level of the hierarchy is thus 1/N of the total offices minus those who are re-
selected to STAY.  Filling the remaining vacancies is then distributed among (as appropriate) the UP POOL, the 
TRANSITION POOL or the local candidate pool according to a heuristic described in flow chart form in Figure 5. 
 
The Vacancy Fill operation, immediately following the Re-selection process starts at the top level to fill those 
vacancies not filled by a STAY selection.  The next priority is those from the UP POOL having just completed a 
term of service at the next level lower.  This provides a means by which those experienced at a given level of 
government may bring their experience to a wider constituency. 
 
 
 
The subsequent priority is to fill any remaining vacancies (unlikely) from the UP POOL from the level 2 below 
the top level, et. seq. until any remaining needed vacancies are filled from the local candidate pool.  For intermediate 
levels, the Vacancy Fill process begins immediately after the Re-selection and assigns first priority to UP POOL 
candidates from one level lower, provided they are in the proper district.  Second priority is assigned to those in the 
DOWN POOL from one level higher, again assuring residency in the instant district.  This latter process is a means 
by which more broadly-experienced representatives may bring their perspective and expertise to a more focused 
constituency, perhaps aiding in harmonizing the entire hierarchy of government. 
 
Figure 4.  Baseline probabilities per hierarchy level (1-4) for end-of-term candidates to be placed into 
the following pools:   STAY (re-select at level); OUT (return to local level pool); DOWN (eligible for 
re-selection at a lower hierarchy level; and UP (eligible for re-selection at a higher hierarchy level). 
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 Further remaining vacancies at the intermediate levels alternate between successively lower levels and 
successively higher levels, always with the proviso that the candidate be within district, until the highest level has 
been mined and the local candidate pool has been mined as well.  At the lowest, most local level of government 
candidates are drawn from level 2, if in district, and if further vacancies remain, from level 3 et. seq. to the top level. 
Finally, if there still remain vacancies at level 1 they are drawn from the local candidate pool.  Being the most local 
level, and thus restrictive of candidates from higher levels (predominantly from other local districts), it is relatively 
more likely that fresh candidates will thusly enter service at level 1. 
 
III. Results 
 
All simulations were performed with MATLAB R2011B3 using M-scripts.  All service terms were set at three 
(3) years regardless of level.  After Initial Selection and the transition years up to Year 4, subsequent Year N 
simulations were approximately 150 minutes in duration on a standard desktop computer.  A total of 21 years were 
simulated.  Figure 6 shows representative validation results showing the number of the prior level for level 3 
Figure 5.  Vacancy Fill process. 
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Figure 7.  Distribution of end-of-year (EOY) vacancies for Level 4 after 
re-selection.  Total leadership at level 4 is 9 members. 
 
Table 1.  End of year re-selection average and standard 
deviation over 21 years.  Column  4 shows total vacancies per 
year.  Vacancies not filled by re-selection are drawn from 
various candidate pools as described elsewhere herein. 
 
LEVEL AVERAGE ST.DEV. VACANCIES
1 789 318 2187
2 70 39 243
3 7.0 5.2 27
4 1.3 0.88 3
selectees at Year 1 (one year from Day 1).  As expected 
from Fig. 4, very nearly 1/3 of the level 3 appointees from 
Day 1 were re-selected to serve a term to run the full 3 
years.  The remainder all come from level 2 (UP POOL).  
For these 81 leadership positions, no candidates were 
required from level 4, level 1, or the local candidate pool.  
 
From Year 1 to Year 21 the number of vacancies for 
level 4 positions were tracked.  With 9 position to fill and 
1/3 of the representatives’ terms expiring each year there 
will be 3 vacancies.  From Fig. 4 there is a 1-in-3 
probability for an expiree being re-selected for level 4, so 
the expected value for vacancies is 2.  Figure 7 shows the 
actual result for the years studied.  The average number of 
vacancies each year for level 4 was 1.3.  Note that zero 
vacancies is a 1-in-33 event and should be expected once 
(maybe twice) in a 21 year 
simulation. 
 
Table 1 shows the end-of-year 
vacancy numbers for each level 
averaged across 21 years, 
including the standard deviation 
value.  Note that the standard 
deviation value drops 
asymptotically to the large N 
limit as would be expected of a 
stochastic process. 
 
Table 2 shows selected 
individuals having been 
stochastically assigned interesting 
or illustrative service records.  
The first example called 
“Founder Returns” shows an 
individual serving only 1 year during the start-up of the government.  This was followed by another 1 year of no 
service, but still assigned within the local 
candidate pool.  In the next year, this 
individual was again selected to level 1 and 
served a normal 3 year term of service.  From 
then until the end of the simulation run this 
individual remained in the local candidate 
pool and was not selected for further service.  
The bottom right “Service Career” individual 
has 20 years of service and most closely 
approximates the “career politician” of a 
government with high degree of continuity.  
Of a population consisting of 3.5 million, this 
is a rare, but not impossible, scenario. 
Figure 6.  Validation results. 
 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
7 
 
 
Across 21 years simulating the operation of Stochastic Democracy those persons who volunteered to be a 
candidate spent on average 2.10 years in service.  With a total of 7380 governmental leadership positions, a bit over 
22,000 held office at least once.  Of the 147,000 volunteers (4% of 3.5M) 125,000 were never selected using the 
baseline probability bins from Fig. 4, or a 89% chance of never being selected.  This outcome is largely a result of 
the relatively high probability of a STAY result from the re-selection process, which favors continuity over 
distributed representation.  To explore this further, a simulation variant to increase representation was performed 
with probability bins giving much smaller opportunities for STAY and much larger opportunities for UP. 
 
Figure 8 shows the variant re-selection probabilities and the distribution of vacancies at Level 3.  The average 
number of vacancies immediately after Re-selection rules were applied increased by an average of 1.4 positions 
compared to the baseline probability distribution functions of Fig. 4, and the number of volunteers never selected 
was 124,000.  These differences are not very significant, indicating that the algorithms are relatively insensitive to 
adjustments to probability functions. 
  
 
 
Table 2.  Selected individuals (out of 3.5 million) with illustrative or interesting service records. 
   
 
   
 
"Founder Returns" LEVEL YEARS SINCE
Initial Selection 1 1 1
From Local Pool 1 3 16
STORY:  One year during government start-up,  in 
pool 1 year, then 1 full term, then 16 year since
"Long Break" LEVEL YEARS SINCE
Initial Selection 1 3 0
Re-select 1 3 14
From Local Pool 1 0  
STORY:  After 6 years as a founding leader, 14 years 
pass before the next round of service
"Up Then Down" LEVEL YEARS SINCE
From Local Pool 1 3 0
from Up Pool 2 3 0
From Up Pool 3 3 0
Re-select 3 3 0
Re-select 3 3 0
from Down Pool 1 3 0
Re-select 1 3 0
STORY:  Effects a rise to higher offices, including 9 
years at Level 3, then 6 years back at Level 1
"Service Career" LEVEL YEARS SINCE
Initial Selection 3 1 0
From Up Pool 4 3 0
Re-select 4 3 0
Re-select 4 3 0
Re-select 4 3 0
from Down Pool 1 3 0
Re-select 1 3 0
STORY:  20 years of service, including 3 re-selects 
at Level 4 (3.7% probability).
Figure 8.  Re-selection probabilities for increased-representation variation, plus end-of-year (EOY) 
vacancies for Level 3 after re-selection.  Total leadership at level 3 is 81 members. 
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IV. Discussion 
The scenario where a fully-staffed government is started in a single day is perhaps uncommon in human history, 
but could be envisioned to apply to space settlement where an ark ship arrives at a recently-prepared habitat. 
Drawing upon the results of the prior two studies1,2,  the first order of business would be for people to select their 
domiciles so that a census could be taken which includes the location of each residence.  The k-means method of 
districting applies to multiple dimensions and can thus be extended to a 3D living space such as the interior of an 
asteroid. 
 
Presuming that most members of such a society are engaged in some productive activity, career, business 
leadership, trade, or other activity where continuity of said activity has value to the enterprise being served, one 
must address the issue of compensation.  While in practical application, a populace may form a consensus (perhaps 
by voting)  on a compensation scheme for its leaders, one possible scheme is presented here for consideration.  This 
proposal assumes that each individual has a history of gross income over a 3 year period prior to the start of a 
Stochastic Democracy start-up.  Note that zero salaries are also anticipated, as may be the case for full-time students 
recently graduated from college, or stay-at-home parents, or indigent elderly.  This proposal also assumes that the 
society or societies from which the population was drawn can establish a metric defining a “poverty level” or similar 
metric of minimal self-sufficient subsistence for self or self plus family. 
 
The heuristic for compensation considers gross income over the prior 3 years (exclusive of suspended animation 
or other enforced income-generating hiatus), which may be steady, growing, shrinking, variable, or absent.  Cases 
are listed here based on gross income over 3 years (GI3), for compensation for office-holders in-service: 
1. GI3 within +/- 10%: compensation at 105% of average 
a. If re-selected, regardless of level, each subsequent term at 105% of prior term’s compensation. 
2. GI3 zero or below poverty level:  compensation at 105% of poverty level 
3. GI3 highly variable: compensation at 105% of median gross income 
4. GI3 declining or rising steadily more than +/- 10%: compensation at 105% of median value 
If an individual is re-selected, regardless of level, each subsequent term at 105% of prior term’s compensation. 
 
 
Another aspect to consider when initiating a new form of governance is the desire for people to vote.  In 
Stochastic Democracy the popular vote is not used for selection of decision-makers in the legislative body.  They 
may be asked to vote on the compensation scheme, and this could be periodically revisited as the community’s 
fortunes change.  Terms of service may also be opened for popular vote, as for example if future medical advances 
permit significantly longer human lifetimes calling for longer terms of governmental service.  Re-selection 
probabilities are also a consideration for popular vote.  Even the relatively large changes in probability distributions 
had minimal effect on the re-selection results, so further adjustments may be an experiment left to the voice of the 
people.  The algorithm behind the Re-selection rules is envisioned to remain fixed, as modifications may be subject 
to manipulation of individuals or small groups to unfair advantage.   
 
The head of state for the government may be a position which is put to the popular vote.  Should the populace 
wish for a single leader to represent them to other communities, or to preside over official ceremonies, or to petition 
the council at the top level of the government hierarchy, there may be a President elected by popular vote.  Each 
level may have a similar figurehead for each district.  Other positions which may be considered for popular vote 
include judges, law enforcement leaders, school boards, commissioners/engineers, and other public offices which 
may benefit from having popular support.  
V. Conclusion 
 
The results indicate that start-up of a fully-staffed Stochastic Democracy and a smooth transition to staggered 
terms is eminently feasible.  Re-selection rules were found to be relatively insensitive to modest adjustments of 
probability distributions between various outcomes (STAY, UP, OUT, DOWN) following successful conclusion of 
a term of service.  Building upon the results of the previous two studies of Stochastic Democracy, this work 
completes the assessment of the following characteristics: 
A. Superior quality of life compared to existing forms of governance 
B. Scalable to any size of community (above 4000), and ability to scale up or down rapidly 
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C. Ability to start instantly and transition smoothly to steady state 
D. Fairly represents all members of a community 
E. Resistant to systemic corruption and undue influence of small minorities 
F. Adaptable to the will of the people through parametric adjustments available to poplar vote. 
 
A key theme behind the genesis of Stochastic Democracy is that people tend to be greedy, selfish, and 
inconsiderate (albeit to differing degrees).  We also have the qualities of generosity, altruism, and empathy, again to 
varying degrees.  None of these are “good” or “bad” but are parts of the whole it is to be human.  A fair and 
equitable system of governance must recognize the potential to provide benefits to society while being resistant to 
corruption. The stochastic nature of the selection rules and vacancy filling studied herein preclude prediction of 
outcomes so that those seeking favor must either apply influence to all candidates or to none.  One potential 
weakness of the Stochastic Democracy model is the need to have sufficient volunteers to fulfill civic duty and 
provide service to their fellow citizens.  If the local candidate pool of volunteers becomes too small, less than 0.06% 
of the population, then an organized cabal could fill conceivably the candidate pool with cronies.  Should this occur, 
it may be self-correcting as previously-complacent citizens recognize the corruption, thereby encouraging a higher 
percentage of volunteers.  It is therefore incumbent on the government to encourage civic responsibility and to 
recognize favorably not only those who serve, but also those who volunteer to be considered. 
 
Perhaps no system of governance can be completely perfect so long as people are involved and making 
decisions.  No one person has perfect judgment, and no one person has the good of everyone equally in mind in all 
that they consider.  As Lord Acton quoted:  “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely”, so the concept 
of a “benign dictatorship” exists only in the imagination.  As technology advances and as space travel and space 
settlement become more widely available there will be communities sufficiently large and diverse where the 
residents call for a representative form of governance.  Stochastic Democracy is put forward as a suitable candidate, 
being not perfect, but perhaps as near unto the ideal as humans are capable of achieving.  Before realizing that 
exciting future when large communities live outside our fragile biosphere there may arise opportunities on earth 
which can provide real-world testing grounds for possible further refinement and bug-fixing in the algorithms. 
 
Researchers interested in exploring these matters are encouraged to contact the author. 
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